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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Starting in the mid 70s, public debt in advanced economies has been rising steadily 
except for a period before the global financial crisis. Government debt fell significantly in 
advanced economies—from an average of 140 to 30 percent of GDP—after World War II 
until the mid 70s on the back of strong post war growth and financial repression (Abbas et al, 
2011). Debt ratios began to rise again with the end of the Bretton Woods system of exchange 
rates and the two oil price shocks. The increase in debt was paused or even reversed in many 
advanced economies in the late 90s and early 2000s but has been significantly exacerbated by 
the recent financial and euro area crises. 
 
Among the many explanations for this trend, surprisingly little attention has been paid 
to the role played by financial cycles. Observers have rightly pointed to expanding welfare 
states, moderating growth, and higher real interest rates as important factors behind the 
secular rise in sovereign debt levels across advanced economies. However, financial cycles 
have also become an increasingly important factor as financial deepening and increasing 
financial intermediation strengthened the interplay between credit and asset prices on the one 
hand and the public finances on the other. 
 
Financial cycles involve a substantial and interrelated buildup of leverage across sectors 
of the economy exacerbating vulnerabilities. Leverage amplifies the business cycle and 
increases the likelihood of a financial crisis through heightened instability (Minsky, 1964). 
Once the bubble bursts, the downturn is often exacerbated by a downward spiral of falling 
asset prices and increasing real value of debt (Fisher, 1933). There are three main channels 
through which financial cycles are likely to affect fiscal policy: tax revenues (direct channel), 
automatic stabilizers (indirect output channel) and balance sheet transfer from the private 
sector (Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2004). During a typical real estate and construction 
boom, fiscal balances tend to improve as revenues increase disproportionately benefiting 
from asset price inflation through a direct revenue channel and indirect output channel. When 
the cycle turns, private sector deleveraging leads to fiscal deterioration as asset prices decline 
and growth slows, especially if automatic stabilizers continue to function fully. In addition, 
the need to support banks can lead to sudden surges in sovereign debt via the bailout channel. 
Thus, financial cycles result in public debt bias when increases in debt during financial cycle 
downturns are larger than reductions during upturns. 
 
While there is a clear link between financial cycles and public budgets, fiscal policy 
often does not account for financial fluctuations. Policy makers have learned to account 
for the ups and downs of ordinary business cycles when evaluating the strength of revenues 
or planning spending. However, as financial cycles are imperfectly correlated with business 
cycles (Poghosyan et al, 2014), focusing on business cycles exposes fiscal outcomes to 
financial sector dynamics above and beyond business cycle fluctuations. As a consequence, 
in many countries prior to the recent financial crisis, public debt did not fall despite strong 
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credit-driven growth and windfall revenues but increased sharply in its aftermath. Political 
economy factors help explain why governments may spend most windfall revenues during 
financial sector booms, often magnifying the impact of house price shocks and leaving fiscal 
policy to absorb the impact of the shock in downturns (Benetrix and Lane, 2011). 
 
In particular, in some euro area countries unsustainable real estate booms were treated 
as permanent and led to substantial fiscal imbalances. In the years prior to the 2009 
financial crisis public sector debt fell moderately in percent of GDP in countries like Ireland 
and Spain, while private non-financial sector debt increased by 90 and 110 percent of GDP 
over 2002–09 respectively. Real estate booms boosted fiscal positions prior to the crisis but 
the subsequent bust triggered public debt increases of around 80 and 100 percent of GDP in 
Spain and Ireland, respectively.  
 
This paper shows that financial cycles have a significant impact on fiscal outcomes and 
result in a larger debt bias—defined as a tendency of debt to increase over the financial 
cycle—than business cycles. First, we identify episodes of financial upturns and downturns 
using house prices, private non-financial debt and stock market prices. Second, we contrast 
these with episodes of output upturns and downturns. We estimate a panel VAR to quantify 
the debt bias allowing for dynamic interaction between house prices, real GDP growth and 
public debt while controlling for supply and demand shocks. The last section concludes and 
offers suggestions for enhancing fiscal policy design to better account for the impact of 
financial cycles.  
 
The main findings are:  
 
 Real estate cycles result in a public sector debt bias of around 5–6 percent of GDP on 
average over the cycle for a symmetric house price shock (10 percent increase in 
upturns and 10 percent decrease in downturns).  
 This bias is stronger when debt—public, private or financial sector—is already high. 
On the other hand it is smaller for countries with low private sector debt. 
 The risk of a significantly higher debt bias than the point estimates mentioned above 
is much larger for financial cycles than for stand-alone business cycles, especially for 
countries with high private or public debt. 
 Automatic stabilizers and discretionary fiscal policy respond to output fluctuations 
more symmetrically across the cycle when they do not correlate to financial cycles. 
Thus, business cycles that don’t coincide with real estate cycles result in a much 
smaller bias. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the identification of financial and 
business cycle episodes and introduces stylized facts. Section 3 presents VAR estimates of 
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debt bias while section 4 analyzes in detail the factors driving debt bias. Section 5 provides 
some policy implications. 
 
II.   STYLIZED FACTS OF FINANCIAL AND OUTPUT GAP EPISODES 
To assess stylized facts of fiscal policy and financial cycles, we identify episodes of high 
and low real house prices, real private sector debt, equity prices and output gap. The 
most common approach to identify ‘financial cycles’ is by using filtering techniques or 
turning point analysis. However, these approaches have difficulties identifying relevant 
episodes of rapid increase in private sector leverage as the sample gets dominated by the 
recent financial crisis.[1] This problem can be mitigated by using an episodic approach based 
on the behavior of financial variables relative to a benchmark. More precisely, a country 
specific downturn (upturn) is identified if the decline (increase) in a given variable (e.g. 
house prices) is more than one standard deviation below (above) the country-specific mean 
for at least three consecutive quarters. These events are then called low (high) episodes of a 
variable X. The dynamics of variables are then analyzed 10 quarters before and after the peak 
or trough of the corresponding variable. The data sample includes 30 countries from 1975Q1 
to 2013Q3 although data availability varies by country and variable (see appendix). 
 
House price growth episodes—both positive and negative—are more persistent than 
credit, equity or output growth episodes. We identify 59 (66) positive (negative) house 
price episodes (Table 1), 44 (45) private credit episodes, 55 (71) equity episodes and 55 (71) 
output gap episodes. While the growth of private sector debt, stock market index and output 
gap fully recovers to pre-peak and pre-trough levels within ten quarters, house price growth 
does not. The growth of house prices remains around 4.5 and 5.5 percentage points below its 
pre-tough and pre-peak levels, respectively, even after 10 quarters (Figure 1). In terms of 
volatility however, measured as the difference between peak and through, stock market 
episodes are the most volatile followed by house price and stock market episodes with output 
gap episodes being the least volatile. 
 
                                                 
[1] For example filtering techniques result in almost no cycles in the first part of the sample missing some 
relevant episodes of rapid increase in private sector leverage. Furthermore, identifying turning points in the 
series using the conventional BBQ algorithm (Classens et. al. (2011) and Hardy and Pagan (2002)) results in 
very few financial or GDP cycle downturns (the US would have had only 10 quarters of GDP downturn since 
1975 and Poland zero since 1994). Standard censoring rules for BBQ algorithm consist, among other things, of 
each phase of at least 2 quarters and a cycle length of 5 quarters minimum. 
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Country Beginning End Maximum Country Beginning End Minimum
1 Spain 78Q1 78Q3 78Q2 Spain 79Q2 82Q3 82Q1
2 Spain 86Q4 90Q1 86Q4 Spain 11Q1 13Q2 11Q1
3 Spain 02Q2 04Q3 02Q2 Germany 82Q2 83Q1 82Q2
4 Germany 77Q3 79Q4 77Q3 Germany 83Q3 85Q1 83Q3
5 Germany 90Q1 91Q1 90Q1 Germany 97Q3 98Q2 97Q3
6 Germany 11Q3 12Q3 11Q3 Germany 02Q1 03Q1 02Q1
7 US 77Q4 79Q1 77Q4 Germany 04Q2 05Q4 04Q2
8 US 01Q4 02Q4 01Q4 US 80Q4 81Q4 80Q4
9 US 03Q2 06Q1 03Q2 US 07Q4 11Q4 07Q4
10 UK 79Q1 79Q3 79Q1 UK 76Q1 77Q3 76Q1
11 UK 87Q3 89Q2 87Q3 UK 81Q3 82Q2 81Q3
12 UK 99Q4 00Q4 99Q4 UK 90Q2 93Q1 90Q2
13 UK 02Q2 03Q2 02Q2 UK 08Q3 09Q3 08Q3
14 France 02Q3 06Q4 02Q3 France 81Q4 84Q4 81Q4
15 Italy 80Q4 81Q3 80Q4 France 92Q1 93Q1 92Q1
16 Italy 89Q1 90Q4 89Q1 France 95Q2 96Q2 95Q2
17 Korea 88Q2 90Q1 88Q2 France 08Q4 09Q4 08Q4
18 Korea 02Q1 03Q2 02Q1 Italy 83Q2 85Q4 83Q2
19 Korea 06Q4 07Q3 06Q4 Korea 91Q4 94Q4 91Q4
20 Sweden 88Q1 89Q3 88Q1 Korea 98Q1 99Q1 98Q1
21 Sweden 00Q1 01Q1 00Q1 Sweden 80Q2 84Q1 80Q2
22 Sweden 05Q4 06Q4 05Q4 Sweden 92Q1 93Q4 92Q1
23 Austria 89Q4 91Q2 89Q4 Austria 98Q2 99Q1 98Q2
24 Austria 91Q4 92Q2 91Q4 Belgium 80Q2 84Q2 80Q2
25 Belgium 76Q1 76Q4 76Q1 Belgium 84Q4 85Q3 84Q4
26 Belgium 77Q2 78Q1 77Q2 Estonia 08Q2 09Q4 08Q2
27 Belgium 89Q1 90Q1 89Q1 Finland 90Q2 93Q3 90Q2
28 Belgium 05Q1 06Q2 05Q1 Greece 10Q2 13Q2 10Q2
29 Cyprus 07Q1 08Q2 07Q1 Ireland 08Q3 12Q3 08Q3
30 Estonia 05Q3 06Q4 05Q3 Lux 08Q2 08Q4 08Q2
31 Finland 87Q4 89Q3 87Q4 Malta 08Q2 09Q2 08Q2
32 Finland 96Q4 97Q3 96Q4 Neth 79Q1 82Q4 79Q1
33 Greece 00Q4 02Q3 00Q4 Neth 12Q2 13Q2 12Q2
34 Ireland 78Q1 78Q4 78Q1 Portugal 93Q1 94Q2 93Q1
35 Ireland 90Q1 90Q3 90Q1 Portugal 12Q3 13Q2 12Q3
36 Ireland 98Q2 01Q1 98Q2 Slovakia 09Q2 09Q4 09Q2
37 Lux 06Q1 06Q4 06Q1 Slovenia 09Q1 09Q4 09Q1
38 Malta 04Q1 05Q1 04Q1 Slovenia 12Q1 13Q1 12Q1
39 Neth 76Q2 78Q1 76Q2 Czech 09Q2 10Q1 09Q2
40 Neth 99Q1 00Q3 99Q1 Denmark 80Q2 82Q4 80Q2
41 Portugal 89Q1 90Q2 89Q1 Denmark 87Q1 87Q4 87Q1
42 Portugal 91Q1 92Q2 91Q1 Denmark 89Q4 90Q4 89Q4
43 Portugal 99Q1 00Q2 99Q1 Denmark 08Q3 09Q3 08Q3
44 Slovakia 07Q2 08Q2 07Q2 Denmark 11Q4 12Q2 11Q4
45 Slovenia 03Q4 04Q2 03Q4 Hungary 09Q3 10Q2 09Q3
46 Slovenia 05Q3 07Q3 05Q3 Lithuania 95Q1 95Q4 95Q1
47 Czech 02Q1 03Q3 02Q1 Lithuania 08Q4 10Q1 08Q4
48 Czech 07Q1 07Q4 07Q1 Norway 89Q1 93Q2 89Q1
49 Denmark 83Q2 84Q1 83Q2 Norway 08Q3 09Q2 08Q3
50 Denmark 85Q3 86Q2 85Q3 Canada 82Q1 83Q1 82Q1
51 Denmark 05Q1 06Q4 05Q1 Canada 84Q1 84Q3 84Q1
52 Hungary 99Q1 00Q4 99Q1 Canada 90Q1 91Q1 90Q1
53 Lithuania 99Q1 99Q3 99Q1 Canada 95Q1 95Q4 95Q1
54 Lithuania 05Q2 06Q3 05Q2 Australia 82Q1 83Q2 82Q1
55 Norway 84Q4 86Q4 84Q4 Australia 90Q2 91Q1 90Q2
56 Norway 94Q1 94Q3 94Q1 Australia 11Q2 12Q1 11Q2
57 Norway 99Q4 00Q3 99Q4 Japan 76Q1 77Q1 76Q1
58 Norway 06Q2 07Q2 06Q2 Japan 92Q2 93Q3 92Q2
59 Canada 86Q2 89Q1 86Q2 Japan 03Q3 05Q2 03Q3
60 Canada 06Q2 08Q1 06Q2
61 Australia 88Q3 89Q3 88Q3
62 Australia 01Q3 04Q1 01Q3
63 Australia 09Q4 10Q2 09Q4
64 Japan 79Q2 82Q4 79Q2
65 Japan 87Q1 88Q2 87Q1
66 Japan 88Q4 91Q1 88Q4
Shaded cells represent house price episodes 
for which there is avaialable public debt 
data and are, therefore, used to estimate 
public debt bias.
1/ Episodes are defined as at least three consecutive quarters above or below one standard 
deviation from the mean
High real HP growth episodes Low real HP growth episodes
Table 1. House Price Episodes   1/
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Figure 1. Median Financial and Business Cycle Episode Dynamics 
(In real growth rates) 1/
 
   1/ HP, PS, YGap and SM stand for house prices, private sector credit, output gap and stock market episodes respectively. 
 
Output and financial episodes are not fully synchronized. In particular, during downturns, 
output recovers at least two quarters earlier than private sector debt but lags house prices. As 
expected, GDP growth follows a standard v-shaped pattern during episodes of negative 
output gap, with growth slowing in the preceding 10 quarters and recovering in the 
subsequent 10 (left panel, Figure 2). 
 
During financial sector downturns, except for stock market driven ones, GDP growth 
declines significantly but the recovery is symmetric and v-shaped. Real GDP growth 
declines around 3.5 percentage points during financial sector episodes in the 10 quarters up 
to the trough but it recovers to pre-through levels within two years. However, it remains 
positive throughout negative stock market episodes although post-trough growth is lower in 
this case (Figure 2, left panel and Table 2). 
 
After post-financial sector booms, real GDP growth declines gradually but persistently 
over the next few years (Figure 2, right panel). Notably, real GDP seems unchanged before 
and after episodes of high equity market growth. On the other hand GDP growth slows down 
significantly, although gradually, post house prices and private sector debt peaks. 
 
Figure 2. Median Real GDP around Financial and Business Cycle Episodes
 
   1/ HP, PS, SM and YGap stand for house prices, private sector credit, stock market and output gap episodes respectively. 
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Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Low High
Public debt 10.2 8.7 -2.1 -2.4 8.1 6.3 33 35
Low public debt 2/ 6.9 8.5 -0.9 -1.2 6.0 7.3 9 12
High public debt 3/ 13.5 14.3 0.9 2.6 14.4 16.9 8 5
Low private debt 4/ 8.7 8.5 -0.3 -1.1 8.5 7.4 15 13
High private debt 5/ 8.6 4.4 -5.2 -2.9 3.4 1.5 8 8
High financial sector debt 6/ 9.2 9.3 -4.3 -3.4 4.9 5.9 11 12
Extreme episodes 15.6 14.9 -2.7 -3.5 12.9 11.4 5 11
Sustained episodes 14.4 12.8 -2.3 -2.4 12.1 10.4 10 17
Overall Balance -0.4 -0.7 1.2 0.5 0.8 -0.1 35 38
Real GDP growth -3.8 -3.4 0.0 0.1 -3.7 -3.3 49 50
Public debt 9.5 5.8 -3.6 -4.2 5.8 1.6 45 44
Low public debt 2/ 10.2 5.9 -1.3 -2.7 8.9 3.2 9 13
High public debt 3/ 5.5 7.5 -2.5 -3.9 3.1 3.6 13 10
Low private debt 4/ 5.7 5.4 -2.1 -2.5 3.6 3.0 18 18
High private debt 5/ 12.1 8.0 -5.5 -5.5 6.5 2.5 12 8
High financial sector debt 6/ 13.7 9.4 -5.0 -4.8 8.7 4.6 15 13
Extreme episodes 18.8 15.2 -2.6 0.0 16.2 15.2 5 6
Sustained episodes 17.2 11.9 -4.9 -5.4 12.3 6.5 16 10
Overall Balance -1.5 -0.7 1.6 1.6 0.1 0.9 43 44
Real GDP growth -2.9 -2.3 0.6 0.9 -2.3 -1.5 45 44
Public debt 1.7 1.2 -1.3 -0.5 0.3 0.7 55 31
Low public debt 2/ 3.0 1.3 0.5 1.0 3.6 2.2
High public debt 3/ 6.7 5.7 -0.5 0.9 6.2 6.6
Low private debt 4/ 2.2 1.3 -1.7 -0.5 0.5 0.7
High private debt 5/ 1.8 1.0 1.4 0.0 3.3 1.0
High financial sector debt 6/ 2.1 0.7 -2.7 -2.8 -0.5 -2.1
Extreme episodes 1.7 1.5 -7.5 -5.5 -5.8 -4.0
Sustained episodes 9.8 9.4 -2.5 -3.1 7.3 6.4
Overall Balance -0.7 -0.3 1.0 1.8 0.2 1.5 60 33
Real GDP growth -4.1 -3.4 1.5 1.7 -2.6 -1.7 71 55
Public debt 9.8 7.6 -4.4 -5.4 5.3 2.2 40 48
Low public debt 2/ 6.3 4.0 -3.3 -2.8 3.1 1.2
High public debt 3/ 15.7 11.1 -6.1 -5.1 9.6 6.0
Low private debt 4/ 10.1 6.9 -5.2 -5.6 4.9 1.3
High private debt 5/ 11.0 5.2 -5.0 -3.7 6.0 1.5
High financial sector debt 6/ 11.1 8.9 -6.2 -5.6 4.9 3.3
Extreme episodes 10.4 7.5 -5.0 -5.6 5.5 1.9
Sustained episodes 12.4 15.8 -4.4 -5.6 8.0 10.2
Overall Balance -2.9 -2.8 0.8 0.9 -2.1 -1.9 45 50
Real GDP growth -6.6 -5.9 0.0 0.0 -6.5 -5.9 53 59
1/ Episodes are defined as at least three consecutive quarters above or below one standard deviation from the mean
2/ Korea, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Norway, Australia
3/ France, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Canada, Japan
4/ Germany, Italy, Austria, Estonia, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Canada, Australia
5/ US, Sweden, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, Japan
6/ UK, France, Korea, Swede, Cyprus, Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Denmark, Japan
Table 2: Financial and Business Cycle Episodes   1/
Output gap
House Prices
Number of 
episodes
Low Episodes High Episodes Net Effect
Private Sector Debt
Stock Market
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House price cycles result in a public sector debt bias that is three times bigger than the 
bias resulting from output cycles and other financial sector variables (Figure 3 and 
Table 2).2 Of the 66 and 59 positive and negative house price episodes we identify, 
availability of public sector debt data reduces the sample to 33 and 35 positive and negative 
episodes respectively (shaded entries in Table 1). Of these, 15 out of 33 positive episodes 
reflect the run up of imbalances to the latest financial crisis while two thirds of the negative 
episodes reflect the impact of the crisis. The bias is the result of the asymmetric impact of 
upswings and downswings, i.e. the reduction in public debt during financial sector upturns is 
smaller than the increase during downturns. Whereas the increase in debt is similar in house 
price and output gap downturns, the larger debt bias associated with house prices is due to a 
much smaller (about a third) decline in public debt, 2 percent versus 6 percent of GDP. 3 The 
net increase in public debt obtained from episodes of house prices, private sector debt, and 
stock market cycles is 6, 2, and 1 percent of GDP, respectively (Figure 3, left panel). These 
estimates, however, are simple correlations and maybe the result of other factors such as 
demand and supply shocks that are accounted for in the next section. 
 
Figure 3. Median Public Sector Debt Bias During Episodes 
(In percent of GDP) 
 
 
III.   VAR ESTIMATES 
We use state dependent panel VARs to quantify the asymmetric dynamic response of 
public debt to financial cycles, while accounting for supply and monetary factors. VARs 
allow for dynamic interactions between house price cycles, real GDP growth and public debt 
to change depending on the state of financial or output cycles. We introduce dummy 
variables to account for episodes of abnormal house price growth and output gap. This allows 
capturing the asymmetric impact of house prices and output gap fluctuations on public debt 
over the cycle. The dummies are based on the episodic approach described above. Finally, 
                                                 
2 In the rest of the paper financial sector results will, therefore, focused on house price rather than private sector 
debt and stock market. 
3 This is consistent with the finding in the April 2015 Fiscal Monitor that fiscal stabilization policies are 
asymmetric through the cycle. 
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we use stochastic simulations to measure uncertainty around VAR estimates. See appendix 
for methodological details. 
 
Formally, the baseline model with dummies can be written as:  
6
, , , ,
1
c t s c t s c t c t
s
Z Z d t   

     
where the vector ,c tZ  represents de-meaned variables of interest at time t for country c; ݀௖,௧ 
denotes a matrix of exogenous dummy variables and t is a common time trend.4 The original 
variables ,c tZ  consists of house price growth (or output gap), real GDP growth to account for 
the output channel, inflation rate as a proxy for supply shocks, the change in policy rates to 
account for changes in monetary policy, and public debt in percent of GDP. The coefficient 
matrix s , coefficient vector  , and δ are estimated by least squares.5 
 
We use state-dependent VARs to capture regime change when economic time series 
exhibit breaks. Similar to Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and Ashenfelter and Rouse 
(1998), we look at the difference between two models which differ only by the cyclical 
position of home prices or the output gap. In contrast to Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), we 
use VARs to analyze the dynamic response of public debt to house price shocks; address 
endogeneity issues among variables; and deal with residual heterogeneity across different 
regimes.6 Regime changes could be exogenous (due to events such as global or regional 
crises (Hamilton, 2005)), or endogenous (such as changes in policy (Sims and Zha, 2006)). 
Bayesian (Sims and Zha, 2006) and threshold (Caner and Hansen, 2001) approaches have 
also been used for endogenously determined state dummies. In this paper, we use pre-
determined state dummies to capture regime changes across episodes of abnormal house 
price growth and output gaps. For simplicity we use pre-determined country-specific state 
dummies and ignore the heterogeneity of factors that cause the regime switching among 
these countries (e.g. domestic shocks, spillover from global shocks, policy changes, and 
political crisis).  
 
Responses under the baseline VAR model (without dummies) are as expected. A real 
house price growth shock (one standard deviation or 3.9 percent) has a positive and 
                                                 
4 We have also estimated the model with interactive dummies. Results are qualitative and quantitatively 
consistent with our baseline specification (see annex). In addition, results remain robust to several other 
specifications of this model including different ordering of variables and inclusion of different trade-weighted 
exchange rates. 
5 Unit root tests indicate that all the endogenous variables in the VAR are stationary (Table A.5), while lag 
length tests indicate that six lags should be used (Tables A.7 and A.8). 
6 See Annex for Pairwise Granger causality tests and residual heteroskedasticity tests. 
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significant impact on real GDP growth, around 2 percent in the long-run, negative and 
significant impact on public debt, 4.7 p.p., and positive and significant impact on inflation, 
around 2 percent, and interest rates, 0.15 p.p. (Figure 4). These results, robust to different 
ordering of the endogenous variables, generally apply to individual country VARs. 7 
 
Figure 4. Response to a One Standard Deviation Shock in Real House Price Growth 
(Confidence intervals of plus/minus two standard deviations) 
 
 
House price induced debt bias remains sizeable and significant when accounting for 
monetary and supply factors and the dynamic interaction with real GDP growth or 
public debt. Negative house price shocks have a large and positive impact on public debt 
while positive house price shocks have a small, negative but barely significant impact 
(Figure 5). These results do not differ across the cyclical position of the business cycle. 
Moreover, the asymmetry in the response of public debt ratio to positive and negative house 
price shocks remains across all states of the output gap. 
 
                                                 
7 Country specific results are broadly consistent with panel VAR estimates. In some cases though, VAR with 
dummies could not be estimated due to the presence of only one or none of the abnormal house price episodes. 
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Figure 5. Median House Price Induced Public Sector Debt Bias from VAR Estimates 
(In percent of GDP) 
 
 
Quantitatively, the debt bias associated with house prices is sizeable while that 
associated with output gap is small and barely statistically significant. The estimated 
VAR debt bias for a 10 percent price fluctuation amounts to 4 percent of GDP over 
10 quarters, 5 percent of GDP in the long-run, across abnormal house price episodes and is 
statistically significant (Figure 6).8 The debt bias for output gap episodes, however, is small 
and barely significant, 0.7 percent of GDP over 10 quarters for a 10 percent shock and only 
significant in the medium-term (Figure 6).9 
 
Figure 6. Public Sector Debt Bias 1/ 
 
   1/ Net debt bias estimate obtained after aggregating the impact of high and low house price shocks (as seen in figure 5). 
 
House-price induced debt bias could be much higher as the distribution of simulated 
impulse responses is significantly skewed upward (Figure 5 and 6). While the long-term 
debt bias of the 5th percentile is close to the median (3 versus 5 percent of GDP), the debt 
                                                 
8 Figure 6 show VAR estimates of net debt bias (i.e. the debt bias from house prices is obtained as the increase 
in public debt during low episodes of house prices weighted over all states of the output gap, minus the 
reduction in debt during high episodes, similarly weighted) and associated 95 percent confidence intervals.  
9 While house price induced debt bias is quantitative and qualitatively robust to different specifications of the 
model, the point estimate of debt bias from output gap cycles becomes negative in specifications where state 
dummies interact with lagged endogenous variables. However, regardless of the specification the median debt 
bias estimate from output gap cycles is small and marginally significant, if not insignificant. 
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bias at the 95 percentile—at 13 percent of GDP—is almost three times the median value. 
Furthermore, there is only 2.5 percent chance that this estimate is below 3 percent of GDP. 
 
The fiscal impact of house price cycles is much greater than that of business cycle 
fluctuations. The estimated increase in public debt when house prices fell is larger than what 
could be explained by output cycle fluctuations.10 Revenue gains during house price 
upswings are largely taken as permanent with governments cutting taxes and increasing 
spending. As a result, many countries with limited policy options or constrained fiscal space 
are forced to adjust their fiscal positions pro-cyclically during financial cycle downturns.11 
Despite this, house price declines tend to result in higher public debt. However, while 
identified asymmetries induced by house-price shocks are significantly larger than those 
from standard business cycles, most of the fiscal policy discussion has been focused on the 
latter. 
 
 
IV.   FACTORS DRIVING PUBLIC DEBT BIAS 
The reduction in debt during house price upturns is mostly due to GDP growth while 
fiscal deficits keep contributing to higher debt (figure 7, left panel). On average, fiscal 
balances improve in upturns a bit more than they deteriorate in downturns but debt bias is the 
result of continuing fiscal deficits even during upturns (figure 7). Thus, on average, observed 
fiscal improvement during upturns only slows down the accumulation of debt. By contrast, 
the overall balance responds more to output fluctuations, therefore leading to lower debt bias. 
 
Figure 7. Median Overall Balance During House Price Episodes 1/ 
 
       1/ Obtained from Financial and Output Gap Episodes 
 
                                                 
10 The dummy for low house price episodes remains significant when including the output gap dummy. 
11 Balance sheet transfers in the form of public sector bail outs are an important factor in some cases. 
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Fiscal policy is pro-cyclical during financial cycles, except stock market driven ones, but 
moderately countercyclical during output downturns.12 Debt dynamics deteriorate during 
downturns as the positive impact of growth vanishes and balance sheet transfers beyond 
fiscal balances increase such as financial sector bailouts, or valuation effects due to exchange 
rate movements (as captured in the residual component of debt accumulation in figure 8). 
However, fiscal policy is pro-cyclical during house price and, to a lesser extent, private 
sector debt driven downturns, as it tends to reduce debt at a time when growth is falling. The 
opposite is true for episodes of output gap downturns. Fiscal policy is also pro-cyclical 
during financial or output gap upturns (with the exception of stock market driven ones) as it 
is the only factor increasing public debt when growth is high. 
 
Figure 8. Public Sector Debt Bias Decomposition, Median 1/
 
            1/ Obtained from Financial and Output Episodes. 
 
Debt bias, particularly from house price episodes, is stronger when public debt is high 
or the episodes are larger in magnitude or duration (figure 9). When public debt is above 
100 percent of GDP on average over the sample, it increases by close to 17 percent of GDP 
over house price cycle episodes. VAR estimates suggest that although countries with high 
public debt have similar debt bias from output gap episodes as the whole sample, house price 
induced debt bias is twice as large (10 and 19 percent of GDP after 10 and 20 quarters 
respectively). Notably, countries with high public sector debt are unable to reduce it during 
house price upturns (figure 9). This is not the case for output cycle induced bias where the 
bias is marginally larger for countries with high public debt than the whole sample. In 
general, and as expected, the bias is also stronger for countries with extreme and sustained 
financial episodes, mostly due to the larger negative impact on growth.13  
                                                 
12 Cyclicality of fiscal policy is defined liberally, not in reference to a business cycle adjusted output measure. 
13 Extreme (sustained) episodes are defined when variable X’s growth is 1.5 (1) standard deviations above or 
below the country-specific mean for at least 3 (6) quarters. 
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Figure 9. Median Debt Bias for Different Groups of Countries 1/ 
 
      1/ Obtained from Financial and Output Episodes. 
 
Debt bias is small for countries that have policy buffers. High financial or non-financial 
private sector debt results in the highest house price induced debt bias using VAR estimates, 
around 9 percent of GDP after 10 quarters (figure 10). 14 However, when private or public 
debt is low, debt bias is marginal. Low private debt, financial or non-financial, results in 
lower balance sheet transfer in house price busts and, therefore, in lower debt bias. Countries 
with low public debt save a larger fraction of the windfall during house price booms as 
manifested by the level and direction of public sector balance (figure 7). 
  
Figure 10. Debt Bias for Different Country Groupings 1/ 
 
                      1/ Obtained from VAR estimates. 
 
                                                 
14 Note that debt bias for countries with high private sector debt measured by house price episodes results in a 
small debt bias in contrast to VAR results. 
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V.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper finds evidence of debt bias—the tendency of debt to increase over the 
cycle—that is significantly larger for house price cycles than stand-alone business 
cycles. In particular, revenue gains during asset price upswings seem to be largely taken as 
permanent with governments cutting taxes and/or increasing spending. These decisions are 
difficult to reverse subsequently in part due to political economy considerations. As a result, 
countries with more policy constraints or limited fiscal space (high private, financial, and 
public sector debt) are forced to adjust their fiscal positions pro-cyclically during financial 
cycle downturns.  
 
Addressing the asymmetric behavior of fiscal policy through financial cycles poses several 
policy challenges including diagnostics of the cycle, identification of its fiscal impact and the 
policy response: 
 
The identification of financial cycles and their relationship with potential output is a 
precondition to quantify their fiscal impact. After the global financial crisis it became 
clear that the full impact of the unsustainable housing boom was not fully captured in 
potential output estimates. In particular, transitory movements in GDP driven by credit and 
house price movements should be identified and distinguished from changes in potential 
output (Berger et al., 2015).  
Ignoring the impact of asset prices on fiscal accounts encourages pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies. Windfall revenues are taken as permanent and largely passed through into 
expenditure increases or tax cuts. At the same time, without reliable measures of the 
underlying financial cycle, policy makers will likely over-estimate the structural fiscal 
position leading to inadequate fiscal buffers when windfall revenues are gone. The direct 
impact of housing booms on fiscal accounts is relatively small (e.g. real estate, transaction 
and capital gains taxes) but should be closely followed as it could give an early indication of 
overheating. At the same time, complementary methodologies to the standard cyclical 
adjustment broadly applied to estimate the underlying “structural” fiscal balance, capturing 
financial sector dynamics should be routinely undertaken. Research in this area has 
intensified lately and focused on the effect of financial cycles on fiscal accounts through its 
impact on output (Girouard 2004, Borio 2012, 2013 and 2014, and Poghosyan 2014). 
Once financial cycles are identified and their fiscal impact quantified, a policy response 
is needed to mitigate financial-cycle induced asymmetries identified in this paper. From 
a macroeconomic perspective, fiscal policy should at least be neutral with respect to financial 
cycles or at most help moderate macroeconomic volatility associated with them by adopting 
a counter-cyclical stance. From a fiscal perspective, fiscal policy should at least aim at 
eliminating the debt bias associated with financial cycles. 
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In particular, 
 The structural fiscal balance should be refined to account for movements in 
financial cycles. The uncertainty surrounding estimates of the various direct and 
indirect channels through which financial cycles impact the fiscal stance suggests that 
ex ante structural fiscal targets should take this debt bias into account.  
 Strong fiscal institutions and robust fiscal rules could also help smooth the pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy by preventing a loose fiscal stance in good times. 
Subsequently, rules enable continued access to financing in bad times by supporting a 
credible commitment to long-term sustainability (April 2015 Fiscal Monitor). 
 In the absence of debt sustainability concerns, automatic stabilizers need to be 
allowed to fully operate throughout the cycle. This will require adhering to the 
correct measure of the structural balance accounting for financial as well as business 
cycles. Discretionary fiscal policy decisions in good times, particularly during house 
price booms, have largely prevented this from happening and resulted in large fiscal 
policy asymmetries along the cycle. 
 Fiscal buffers should internalize financial sector risks weighted by its likelihood. 
Large increases in public debt associated with crisis-related bail outs have a 
disproportionate and long lasting effect on fiscal accounts. Furthermore, buffers 
should also reflect the uncertainty surrounding the identification of financial cycles 
and its impact on the underlying structural fiscal position. 
 Policy instruments, particularly tax policy, should not exacerbate debt bias 
associated with house price and financial sector fluctuations (De Mooij, 2011). 
For example, many tax systems offer a tax advantage for corporate debt financing. At 
the same time, tax distortions (e.g. tax preferences for owner-occupied housing) 
and/or regulatory distortions (e.g. rent control, regulatory constraints on building, etc) 
tend to amplify housing booms. Addressing some of these underlying distortions 
might be needed to ameliorate debt bias. On the other hand, macroprudential policies 
are the first line of defense against financial sector booms and busts. 
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APPENDIX: DATA 
 
We use quarterly data for 30 advanced and emerging economies. Geographically most 
countries are from Europe but the sample also includes the US, Canada, Australia and Japan. 
The sample period is country specific and it depends on country availability. It expands from 
1975Q1 to 2013Q2 in the case of the US, country with more data available. Data sources 
include the Bank for International Settlements, Bloomberg, Eurostat, Haver, national 
authorities, OECD House Price Index, IMF World Economic Outlook and IMF staff 
calculations. Data include data on indebtedness of households, non-financial corporate, 
financial corporate and government as well as fiscal variables (revenues, expenditures, 
interest payments). It also includes data on private credit as well as different financial sector 
indices (house price and stock market indices). A detail of the country coverage as well as 
some summary statistics is provided in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable
Austria 1999Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q4 - 2013Q2 1995Q4 - 2013Q2 1988Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1990Q1 - 2013Q2
Belgium 1979Q4 - 2013Q2 1992Q4 - 2013Q2 1992Q4 - 2013Q2 1980Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q3
Cyprus 2000Q1 - 2013Q1 2004Q1 - 2013Q1 2004Q1 - 2013Q1 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q4 - 2013Q2 2006Q1 - 2011Q3
Estonia 1996Q1 - 2013Q1 2003Q4 - 2013Q2 1996Q1 - 2013Q1 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1996Q3 - 2013Q2 2003Q3 - 2011Q4
Finland 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1975Q1 - 2013Q2 1981Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
France 1994Q4 - 2013Q2 1994Q4 - 2013Q2 1994Q4 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Germany 1991Q1 - 2013Q1 1999Q1 - 2013Q1 1999Q1 - 2013Q1 1990Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q3
Greece 1999Q1 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 2000Q1 - 2013Q2 1987Q4 - 2013Q2 1997Q1 - 2011Q4
Ireland 2002Q1 - 2013Q1 2002Q1 - 2013Q1 2002Q1 - 2013Q1 1997Q1 - 2013Q2 1987Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Italy 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q3
Luxembourg 2005Q1 - 2013Q2 2005Q1 - 2013Q2 2005Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1999Q1 - 2013Q2 2005Q1 - 2011Q3
Malta 2003Q4 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2003Q4 - 2013Q2 2000Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q4 - 2013Q2 2000Q1 - 2011Q3
Netherlands 1998Q4 - 2013Q2 2005Q1 - 2013Q2 2005Q1 - 2013Q2 1977Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Portugal 1999Q1 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1986Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1988Q1 - 2011Q4
Slovak Republic 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 2000Q2 - 2013Q2 2005Q1 - 2011Q4
Slovenia 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 2003Q2 - 2013Q2 1995Q2 - 2011Q3
Spain 1980Q4 - 2013Q2 1980Q4 - 2013Q2 1980Q4 - 2013Q2 1980Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1971Q1 - 2011Q4
Czech Republic 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q3 - 2013Q2 1999Q1 - 2011Q1
Denmark 1990Q4 - 2013Q2 1998Q4 - 2013Q2 1998Q4 - 2013Q2 1990Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q3
Hungary 1989Q4 - 2013Q2 1989Q4 - 2013Q2 1989Q4 - 2013Q2 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1995Q3 - 2013Q2 1998Q1 - 2011Q3
Latvia 2010Q4 - 2013Q2 2010Q4 - 2013Q2 2011Q4 - 2013Q1 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 2000Q1 - 2013Q2 2004Q1 - 2011Q4
Lithuania 2003Q4 - 2013Q4 2003Q4 - 2013Q4 2003Q4 - 2013Q4 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 2000Q1 - 2013Q2 1994Q1 - 2011Q4
Poland 2003Q4 - 2013Q4 2003Q4 - 2013Q4 2003Q4 - 2013Q4 1995Q1 - 2013Q2 1992Q4 - 2013Q2 2006Q3 - 2011Q4
United Kingdom 1987Q1 - 2013Q2 1987Q1 - 2013Q2 1987Q1 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Sweden 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 1980Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Norway 1965Q4 - 2013Q2 1995Q4 - 2013Q2 1995Q4 - 2013Q2 1978Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Canada 1990Q1 - 2013Q2 1990Q1 - 2013Q2 1990Q1 - 2013Q2 1961Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
United States 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1980Q1 - 2013Q4 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Australia 1988Q2 -2013Q2 1988Q2 - 2013Q2 1988Q2 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1969Q4 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q4
Japan 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1997Q4 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1960Q1 - 2013Q2 1970Q1 - 2011Q3
Sources: Bank for International Settlements; Bloomberg; Eurostat; Haver; National Authorities; OECD House Price Index; IMF World Economic Outlook; and IMF staff calculations
Stock Index House Price Index
Household and Non-
Fin. Corp. Debt
General Government 
Debt
Financial Corporate 
Debt
GDP growth
Table 1. Data Coverage
21 
 
 
TECHNICAL ANNEX 
 
A.   State Dependent Panel VAR: A Conceptual Framework 
This appendix summarizes the conceptual framework used to estimate the dynamic 
interaction between house price cycles, real GDP growth and public debt, while accounting 
for supply shocks and changes in monetary policy. Specifically, the panel VAR includes the 
following variables for country c at year t: the change in public debt-to-GDP ratio ,c ty , the 
real house price growth ,c tx , and all other covariates 
(2,3,4)
,c tz  of secondary interest (policy rate 
change, real GDP growth, and inflation rate change). Denote all these time series by the 
vector
,
(2,3,4)
, ,
,
c t
c t c t
c t
x
Z z
y
      
. 
 
Using dummies of output and house price episodes we estimate the asymmetric impact of 
business and financial cycles on public debt. The model with a dummy for high house price 
growth episodes, for example, produces the impulse response function for normal and low 
house price growth episodes. Thus, there are nine different states of the world reflecting 
output and house price episodes that have different (historical) likelihoods (Table A.1). The 
marginal effect of a certain episode is computed as the difference between the impulse 
response function of the VAR model with and without the dummy that represents the 
episode. 15 Thus, there are three marginal responses of public debt to a 10 percent positive 
house price shock in high house price episodes (for different states of the output gap: high, 
normal and low). The same is the case for negative house price shock. Therefore, for each 
state of the output gap there is an estimate of debt bias obtained as the difference between the 
increase in public debt in low house price growth episodes and the reduction in public debt 
during high episodes. An estimate of the total debt bias is obtained as a weighted average of 
the estimates for the three states of the output gap weighted by their likelihood (Table A.1). 
  
 
 
                                                 
15 We obtain Cholesky impulse response functions that are normalized for a house price shock of 10 percent—
the medium cumulative growth observed during low house price episodes—ensuring comparability of impulse 
response functions across the different VARs for different dummy episodes.  
High Normal Low Total
High Growth 1.3 7.8 0.2 9.3
Normal Growth 5.6 72.4 3.5 81.5
Low Growth 0.5 7.0 1.8 9.3
Total 7.4 87.1 5.5 100H
ou
se
 P
ric
es
Output Gap
Table A.1. Probability of House Price and Output Gap Episodes
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Stochastic simulations are used to measure house price volatility and uncertainty surrounding 
the debt bias. Each simulation generates a random sample of 25 countries and 140 
observations for each country. We simulate 5000 random sub samples and estimate the 16 
VARs and the debt bias for each sub sample. From these 5000 simulated biases, we extract 
the median debt bias, the 95th percent confidence interval around the median, and other 
statistics.  
 
Table A.2 shows strong evidence of heterogeneity across different episodes of house prices 
and output gap (we only report the standard errors from the equation of house price). Thus, 
state-dependent VARs will help mitigating heterogeneity. 
 
 
To segregate the entire data sample, we use the notation (h,g), where h and g take values 0, 1 
and 2 to indicate episodes of normal, high and low house price and output gap, respectively. 
 
Pair-wise Granger Causality tests (Table A.3) show strong evidence of endogeneity from one 
variable to all other variables within six quarters (we have also performed block exogeneity 
test with similar results). To address this issue we apply a vector auto-regression model for 
any given pair (h,g): 
 
( , ) ( , )
, , ,
1
n
h g h g
c t c s c t s c t
s
Z Z t   

     
 
where c  is country c’s fixed effect and the term t would offset the potential quadratic trend 
in the data. As our primary interest is the dynamic change of ,c ty  with respect to ,c tx  in a 
generic country and episode setting, we remove the fixed effects by de-meaning all variables.  
Ygap normal Ygap low Ygap high
HP normal 5.03 3.28 3.38
HP low 2.13 3.82 6.46
HP high 4.52 0.37 3.84
Measured by the standard error of the resiudal in the house price equation from 
VARs  for different subsamples. 
Table A.2. Cross-regime Heteroskedasticity 
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The VAR of demeaned variables is then 
 
( , ) ( , )
, , ,
1
n
h g h g
c t s c t s c t
s
Z Z t  

                                (10) 
 
where 
( , )
,
( , )
,
( , )
,
h g
c t
h g
c t
h g
c t
x
Z
y
      
  is the de-meaned vector of ( , ),h gc tZ . Table A.4 shows the homogeneity 
of shocks within each episode (h,g) in (10). Within each of the nine existing regimes, test 
results provide a validation of the least square estimation as well as support a regime-
varying, rather than time-varying, impulse response analysis. 
 
 
 
The k-quarter-ahead dynamic effect of a house price shock on public debt ratio is quantified 
by the impulse response function IRF(g,h)16 (Table A.5) and can be computed as, 
 
                                                 
16 Cholesky decomposition is applied to address the interdependence among the contemporaneous shocks 
( , , ) '.t t tZ x y     Variables are ordered by the reverse size of their endogeneity in the VAR model without any 
dummies. Our simulations also indicate that the ordering of the variables does not materially change our major findings 
when k>5. 
Sample: 1975Q1 2013Q2
Lags: 6
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 Z2 does not Granger Cause Z1 2645 9.43975 3.00E-10
 Z1 does not Granger Cause Z2 13.8012 2.00E-15
 Z3 does not Granger Cause Z1 2302 1.68136 1.22E-01
 Z1 does not Granger Cause Z3 8.44507 4.00E-09
 Z4 does not Granger Cause Z1 2709 1.89244 7.84E-02
 Z1 does not Granger Cause Z4 8.66203 2.00E-09
 Z5 does not Granger Cause Z1 1709 2.1641 0.0438
 Z1 does not Granger Cause Z5 8.55621 4.00E-09
 Z3 does not Granger Cause Z2 2326 9.88715 9.00E-11
 Z2 does not Granger Cause Z3 14.7634 1.00E-16
 Z4 does not Granger Cause Z2 2476 12.4649 7.00E-14
 Z2 does not Granger Cause Z4 15.6029 1.00E-17
 Z5 does not Granger Cause Z2 1692 1.8464 0.0867
 Z2 does not Granger Cause Z5 12.8817 3.00E-14
 Z4 does not Granger Cause Z3 2379 7.55505 5.00E-08
 Z3 does not Granger Cause Z4 9.29617 4.00E-10
 Z5 does not Granger Cause Z3 1646 4.63305 1.00E-04
 Z3 does not Granger Cause Z5 3.53296 0.0018
 Z5 does not Granger Cause Z4 1685 14.1491 9.00E-16
 Z4 does not Granger Cause Z5 4.13861 4.00E-04
Table A.3. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Note: Z1,Z2,Z3,Z4,Z5 are real house price growth, real GDP 
growth, inflation rate change, policy rate change, and change in 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, respectively, all demeaned.
p-values for heteroskedasticity test for VAR in each eposide
Ygap normal Ygap low Ygap high
HP normal 0.000 0.057 0.000
HP low 0.000 0.000 0.000
HP high 0.000 0.000 0.002
 Source:  IMF staff estimates.
Table A.4. Within-regime Homoskedasticity 
 Note: The p-values are derived from the estimated VAR for the corresponding 
subsample.
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or its cumulative value 
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  Equality (11) is valid since tZ  and tZ  differ by a constant 
vector and the indices c and t can be dropped because of the homogeneity in the model.  
 
 
 
The debt bias for the specific g (e.g. high, low and normal output gap) is defined as the 
difference between the responses of the public debt to a negative house price shock in low 
house price episodes and a positive shock in high house price episodes: 
 
(2, ) (1, ) (2, ) (1, )
(2, ) (1, ) (2, ) (1, )( ) .
g g g g
t k t k t k t k
g g g g g
t t t t
y y y yB k
x x x x
                                                 (12) 
 
The negative sign in (2, )gtx  indicates a negative house price shock. 
 
The expected k-quarter-ahead debt bias across the three output gap episodes is then computed 
as follows, using historic likelihood of all of the g scenarios (high, low and normal): 
 
(2, ) (1, )2 2
(2, ) (1, )
0 0
( ) ( ) Pr ob(g) Pr ob(g)
g g
t k t k
g g g
g g t t
y yB k B k
x x
 
 
            
 
where Prob(g) is the probability of occurrence of g = 0, 1 and 2 in the historical data (last row 
in table A.1).17 
 
 
To estimate (12) we apply the least square procedure using all available data and all possible 
combinations of dummes for house price and output gap episodes as follows: 
 
                                                 
17 Another possibility to aggregate the IRFs for all (h,g) pairs and to compute the debt bias across different output gap 
episodes is to apply a priori weights as in Shapley (1953) where the state dummies act as the players and the dynamic 
responses as the payoff function. This is particularly useful when the historical probabilities are not available or likely 
deviate from future prospects. Our simulations suggest that both weighting systems produce similar results.  
Normal Y Gap (g=0) High Y Gap (g=1) Low Y Gap (g=2)
Normal House Price (h=0) IRF(0,0) IRF(1,0) IRF(2,0)
High House Price (h=1) IRF(0,1) IRF(1,1) IRF(2,1)
Low House Price (h=2) IRF(0,2) IRF(1,2) IRF(2,2)
Table A.5. Matrix of Impulse Responses
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In the above formula, { }gI and { }hI  are dummy variables for a given pair (g,h). This 
modification allows for comparison of results estimated using the common data sample. For 
h=1 and 2, the modified VARs are 
 
, , { } 1 { 1} ,
1
,
n
c t s c t s g g h c t
s
Z Z b I c I t   

                                                            (13) 
, , { } 2 { 2} ,
1
,
n
c t s c t s g g h c t
s
Z Z b I c I t   

                                                           (14) 
, , { } 1 { 1} 2 { 2} ,
1
.
n
c t s c t s g g h h c t
s
Z Z b I c I c I t    

                                                (15) 
 
In an intuitive sense, the term 1 { 1}hc I  in (13) accounts for high house price episodes; so the 
IRF, denoted IRF(13), represents the impact of a house price shock in low and normal house 
price episodes, i.e., it combines rows 2 and 4 in table A.5. Similarly, the term 2 { 2}hc I   in (14) 
accounts for low house price episodes and the associated IRF, IRF(14), represents the impact 
of a house price shock in high and normal house price episodes. IRF in (15), denoted 
IRF(15), represents the impact of a house price shock in normal house price episodes only 
(row 2 in table A.5). Therefore, the impact of a positive house price shock in high house 
price episodes is measured by the difference of IRF in (14) and IRF in (15):
(14) (15)IRF IRF . 
 
By the same argument, the impact of a negative house price shock in low house price 
episodes is measured by the difference of IRF in (15) and IRF in (13): 
[ (13) (15)] (15) (13)IRF IRF IRF IRF    . The first negative sign in the above equation 
indicates a negative house price shock. 
 
Finally, (12) is approximated by the doubled IRF of (15), net of the total IRF of (13) and 
(14):[ (15) (13)] [ (14) (15)] 2 (15) [ (13) (14)]IRF IRF IRF IRF IRF IRF IRF       . 
 
B.   Diagnostic Tests for the VAR Models 
In this appendix, we provide a battery of diagnostic tests for the VAR models (10, 13-15). 
 
Stationarity Tests 
 
26 
 
 
Popular panel unit root tests (e.g., Levin-Lin-Chu, Breitung, Im-Pesaran-Shin, Phillips-
Perron, and Augmented Dickey-Fuller) assume either common stochastic trends or 
idiosyncratic stochastic trend for each country (but not both). All five panel time series may 
exhibit both common and idiosyncratic trends. Unit root tests indicate stationarity for all the 
variables. 
 
 
 
Cross dependence between the dummies and the endogenous variables 
 
To account for the possible endogeneity of the dummies, models (13)-(15) could be 
complemented by adding cross dependence terms between the dummies and the variables of 
interest. A comparison between the two models—with and without cross dependence 
terms—reveals that while such an addition did not materially changes the estimates of (12), it 
increases model uncertainty measured by the Bayesian information criteria (BIC). BIC 
estimates a function of the posterior probability of a model being true, under certain Bayesian 
setting; a lower BIC means that a model has lower uncertainty. For all (g,h) in table A.7, 
VAR estimates without cross dependence have a lower BIC value than the corresponding 
VAR with cross dependence. Thus, we use the model without cross dependence. 
Cross-sections: 30
Sample: 1975Q1 2013Q2
Exogenous variables: None
Automatic lag length selection based on Asymptotic t-statistic (p=0.05): 1 to 13
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett 
Method Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t * -13.9 -11.5 -7.2 -29.2 -14.5
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square * 296.4 238.6 205.1 1,188.4 345.6
PP - Fisher Chi-square  * 312.0 453.2 678.9 3,740.6 250.2
Table A.6. p-values for Panel Unit Root Test
* All results are significant at the 1% level
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Lag Length Selection 
 
To determine an optimal lag for the VARs, we use the Bayesian information criteria to the 
VAR without dummies. Table A.8 selects six as the lag length for the VARs and Table A.9 
shows that all the six lags are statistically significant. 
 
 
 
Model Names  With Cross Dependence  Without Cross Dependence  Probability
VAR0000 17.2532 17.2532 0.7236
VAR0001 17.3144 17.2510 0.0351
VAR0010 17.3397 17.2466 0.0558
VAR0011 17.4038 17.2430 0.0909
VAR0100 17.3037 17.2507 0.0697
VAR0101 17.3736 17.2495 0.0177
VAR0110 17.3901 17.2437 0.0050
VAR0111 17.4644 17.2412 0.0227
VAR1000 17.3512 17.2428 0.0777
VAR1001 17.4079 17.2399 0.0022
VAR1010 17.4399 17.2362 0.0132
VAR1011 17.5001 17.2317 0.0154
VAR1100 17.3958 17.2374 0.1474
VAR1101 17.4630 17.2356 0.0199
VAR1110 17.4844 17.2302 0.0182
VAR1111 17.5563 17.2270 0.0381
1/ Optimal lag length following SIC determined 6 lags for all VAR models
Note : binary suffix in the model names indicates the appearance (1) of the dummies or not (0), in the 
order of HP High, HP Low, Ygap high, and Ygap Low.
Table A.7. BIC in the VAR models with or without Cross Dependence of Dummies  1/
Endogenous variables: Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 
Sample: 1975Q1 2013Q2
Included observations: 1435
Lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Exogenous variables: none
LogL -12,908 -12,693 -12,580 -12,432 -11,922 -11,804 -11,732 -11,693
BIC 18.12 17.94 17.91 17.83 17.25 17.21 17.24 17.31
Exogenous variables: trend
LogL -12,877 -12,664 -12,551 -12,405 -11,905 -11,787 -11,715 -11,673
BIC 18.10 17.93 17.90 17.82 17.25 17.21 17.24 17.31
Table  A.8. VAR Lag Order Selection by the Bayesian Information Criteria
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Cross-validation of the VAR models 
 
The results estimated using (10) have been cross-validated by exploring four alternative 
models. For example, an alternative model for estimating (12) is to consider using the 
country-specific de-trended data, defined by 
, ,c t c t c cZ Z t     
where c  and c  are chosen to minimize 2,c t
t
Z  for each country i. Modeling  ,c tZ  by a VAR 
would, however, underestimate the size of the true shocks. In the IRF analysis and associated 
bias estimate for each episode, the constant covariance of the shocks comes from two parts: 
global and country-specific, i.e.,  within cross-section and between cross-section variances. 
By idiosyncratically de-trending the data, we decrease the within cross-section variance. 
 
Other alternative models that have been considered include: 
 
Model 1: VAR on ,c tZ  without common deterministic trend, 
, , ,
1
n
c t s c t s c t
s
Z Z 

  . 
 
Model 2: VAR on original data using common deterministic trend and common intercept, 
, , ,
1
n
c t s c t s c t
s
Z Z t   

    . 
 
Model 3: VAR on original data using cross-sectional dummies and common trend 
, , { } ,
1
n
c t s c t s c c c t
s
Z Z I t   

    . 
Sample: 1975Q1 2013Q2
Included observations: 1495
Chi -squared test s tatis tics  for lag exclus ion: Numbers  in [] a re p-values
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Joint
Lag 1 2017.2260 1627.8280 2719.7140 255.0955 1154.9060 7292.4860
[ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000]
Lag 2 17.8770 30.5979 66.3491 48.3963 19.7005 164.7940
[ 0.003105] [ 1.12e-05] [ 5.88e-13] [ 2.95e-09] [ 0.001422] [ 0.000000]
Lag 3 26.2649 7.1410 9.9941 3.6916 1.7450 51.5834
[ 7.93e-05] [ 0.210364] [ 0.075401] [ 0.594614] [ 0.883189] [ 0.001353]
Lag 4 223.7293 257.7452 281.3290 10.8730 391.1252 1235.7710
[ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.053957] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000]
Lag 5 338.5626 161.7195 273.5293 27.5142 187.6127 946.5469
[ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] [ 4.53e-05] [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000]
Lag 6 125.9173 35.0774 67.5365 27.8596 19.1340 248.8075
[ 0.000000] [ 1.45e-06] [ 3.33e-13] [ 3.88e-05] [ 0.001815] [ 0.000000]
df 5 5 5 5 5 25
Table A.9. VAR Lag Exclusion Wald Tests
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Our simulations show that all these models support the same conclusions as in (10). Models 1 
and 2 have similar magnitude as (10) while Model 3 yields lower debt bias estimates. The 
reason is that Model 3 filters some country-specific (idiosyncratic) variance, as ,c tZ does.  
